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Abstract—Early identification of COVID-19 using a deep
model trained on Chest X-Ray and CT images has gained
considerable attention from researchers to speed up the process
of identification of active COVID-19 cases. These deep models
act as an aid to hospitals that suffer from the unavailability of
specialists or radiologists, specifically in remote areas. Various
deep models have been proposed to detect the COVID-19 cases,
but few works have been performed to prevent the deep models
against adversarial attacks capable of fooling the deep model by
using a small perturbation in image pixels. This paper presents
an evaluation of the performance of deep COVID-19 models
against adversarial attacks. Also, it proposes an efficient yet
effective Fuzzy Unique Image Transformation (FUIT) technique
that downsamples the image pixels into an interval. The images
obtained after the FUIT transformation are further utilized for
training the secure deep model that preserves high accuracy of
the diagnosis of COVID-19 cases and provides reliable defense
against the adversarial attacks. The experiments and results show
the proposed model prevents the deep model against the six
adversarial attacks and maintains high accuracy to classify the
COVID-19 cases from the Chest X-Ray image and CT image
Datasets. The results also recommend that a careful inspection is
required before practically applying the deep models to diagnose
the COVID-19 cases.
Index Terms—Adversarial Attacks, Chest X-Ray, COVID-19,
CT Image, Deep Models, Fuzzy Unique Image Transformation.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
The occurrence of a novel CORONAVIRUS [1] challenges
the healthcare systems of all across the world to control an
exponential growth of CORONAVIRUS that first occurred in
Wuhan and Hebei cities of the China [1] in December 2019
and later spared to other countries across the world. Based on
the degree of spread of the virus World Health Organization
(WHO) declared the disease as COVID-19 pandemic [2].
Cough, fatigue, fever, and illness in the lungs are among the
earlier symptoms suggested by clinical experts for diagnosing
COVID-19 cases at an initial stage. Control and prevention
of the COVID-19 demand the maximum number of medical
tests. Healthcare systems across the world suffer from a lack
of effective testing toolkits to identify COVID-19 cases in
a current situation. The early identification of COVID-19
cases would be helpful to quarantine the high-risk COVID-
19 patients and also useful to break a chain of further spread
of the virus in the community.
In an attempt to develop a testing toolkit for the diagnosis of
COVID-19, researchers from the radiology domain suggested
the use of reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) test [3]. However, the test requires long latency to iden-
tify COVID-19 cases and demands highly expert radiologists
[3]. The RT-PCR test also suffers from a high false-positive
rate during the diagnosis of COVID-19 cases [3], which is
not acceptable. A good survey of the various image, sound,
and blood test report-based datasets available for diagnosing
COVID-19 cases can be found in [4]. Recent studies [5], [6]
have shown Chest X-Ray images of COVID-19 patients play
a vital role in timely identification and further control of the
COVID-19 cases. Inspired by the success of work on chest X-
Ray and CT scan images, various methods and computer-aided
systems have been proposed that combine deep learning meth-
ods and radiology expert knowledge to identify the COVID-
19 cases. A comprehensive study of various deep learning-
based methods for diagnosis of COVID-19 using chest X-Ray
and CT Scan images can be found in [7], [8], [9], [10]. The
majority of the deep learning models proposed for identifying
COVID-19 cases are based on transfer learning [9], [11], [12],
[13], attention-based mechanism [14], [15], [16], [17], self-
supervised learning [18], [19] and explainable deep models
[20], [21], [22], [23]. On the other hand, very little work
has been performed towards the vulnerability of deep models
against adversarial attacks [24] capable of misleading the deep
model with a small perturbation in pixels of an input image.
Identification of COVID-19 cases requires expert opinions
over the chest X-Ray and CT scan images. It also involves
the communication of the COVID-19 data through the web to
receive the expert’s suggestions and reports.
The deep learning models have achieved new heights of
state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods in object detection [25], text
mining [26], speech recognition [27] and computer vision [28].
However, it has been well explored that the deep models are
sensitive towards small perturbation in an input and easily
fooled by the attacker. This paradigm is also known as Adver-
sarial attack [24], [29]. The study of adversarial attacks was
introduced a decade ago [30] and gained huge attention from
researchers of deep learning due to the increasing demand
for deep learning techniques in various real-life applications.
Data and models privacy and security concerns make the study
of adversarial attacks popular in deep learning research. The
existence of the adversarial attacks put various questions on
the generalization of deep models for the diagnosis of COVID-
19 using medical images. In [31], Hirano et al. investigated
the performance analysis of deep models for the diagnosis
of COVID-19 cases in the presence of adversarial attacks.
A previous study suggested the vulnerability as a major
bottleneck for the medical image-based diagnosis [32].
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Adversarial attacks on deep models can be subdivided into
two major classes. The first type of attack is known as a
white-box attack [30], and the second type of attack is known
as a black-box attack [30]. The white-box attacks use the
full knowledge of the deep model, dataset, architecture, and
parameters. However, the scenario is different in black-box
attacks that only partially access the information related to
deep models. The proposed method aims to provide defense
against white-box attacks that are very hard to prevent in
practical scenarios. Adversarial attacks are further broadly
classified into two classes, targeted and untargeted attacks.
The targeted attacks modify the clean images into adversarial
images that make the deep model to classify the input image
into a class set by the attackers. For an example, if a clean
image of the non-COVID-19 case is transformed into an
adversarial image with a target label set as COVID-19 case
and the model classifies the images as COVID-19 instead
of a normal case. On the other hand, in case of untargeted
attacks, the image is transformed into an adversarial image
such that the model classifies the image into labels other
than the true class label of the image. For an example, the
image belongs to the COVID-19 case misclassified as a normal
case or pneumonia case after an untargeted adversarial attack.
The work presents in this paper intents to present a defense
mechanism against an untargeted class of adversarial attacks.
A pioneer work that focuses on the generation of the
adversarial examples was presented by Goodfellow et al.
[33]. The author proposed a fast gradient-based approach
to generate adversarial samples. By taking inspiration from
the initial work of Goodfellow et al. [33], various methods
have been proposed to generate adversarial examples. Moosavi
et al. [34] proposed a deep fool mechanism that generates
perturbation until the confidence of the model decreases on
the correct label for the given input. The iteration to create
perturbation stops when the deep model is fooled. In [35],
the author proposed an attack mechanism that uses an Adam
optimization method [36] for an adversarial attack. Sharma et
al. [37] proposed a framework that uses attention feature maps
to generate adversarial examples to attack the deep model.
Besides the development of adversarial attack techniques,
numerous defense methodologies [38], [39] have been pro-
posed to prevent the deep models against the adversarial
attacks. The defense methodologies are further grouped into
two categories black box defense and white box defense. The
white box defense involves adversarial images as input to
train the deep model. The adversarial images are generated by
one of the adversarial attack techniques [33], [34] mentioned
above. On the contrary, the black box defense does not involve
the adversarial images to train the deep model that prevents
adversarial attacks. Data augmentation techniques [39], input
transformation [40] and an encryption inspired shuffling of
images [41] are among the popular techniques that are well
explored to perform black-box defense. A comprehensive
study of various defense techniques against the adversarial
attacks can be found in [38]. The white box defenses are
more successful as compared to the black box defense. Still,
they suffer from a high probability of failure against the
attacks having a complexity greater than the adversarial attacks
employed to generate the adversarial images while training
the white box defense models. The black box defense is
independent of the complexity of the attack mechanism thus
gained more attention to develop robust and secure deep
models against the adversarial attacks.
The proposed fuzzy unique image transformation (FUIT)
technique belongs to the black box defense category. To the
best of our knowledge, a fuzzy logic-based black box defense
has not been proposed to prevent the COVID-19 images from
adversarial attacks. The two significant contributions of this
paper are as follows. The first contribution is incorporating a
fuzzy unique transformation method within the architecture of
a deep model to secure the deep model against the adversarial
attacks. The second contribution is to provide a comprehensive
study of the performance of the proposed model to classify the
COVID-19 cases under the various adversarial attacks.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II
presents the brief introduction of the adversarial attack and
fuzzy set theory. Section III presents details of the method-
ology used to train the secure deep model using FUIT trans-
formed images to prevent the adversarial attacks. Section IV
presents experiments, results and ablation study, and finally,
conclusions and future work are presented in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section presents a brief introduction of adversarial
attack and fuzzy set.
A. Adversarial Attacks
The major aim of adversarial attacks [24] is to modify pixel
values by small amount . The changes that occur in a modified
image are invisible for humans but well understood by deep
learning models. If f denotes a function that represents a deep
model with parameters θ learned using input image X and
label y
y = f(X, θ) (1)
After adding small perturbation to image pixels the adversarial
input image X
′
satisfies the following condition:
||X ′ −X|| ≤  (2)
y′ = f(X
′
, θ) (3)
When the model is evaluated against adversarial image X
′
,
then y 6= y′, that results in a degradation in the model’s
performance. The phenomenon of a decrease in the classi-
fication rate of the model to classify the images is known as
the adversarial attack that easily fools the model to misclassify
the input image modified using a small perturbation . In this
paper, our primary aim is to prevent the deep model against
adversarial attacks.
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B. Fuzzy Set
A set whose every element have membership value is known
as fuzzy set (F˜ ) [42].
F˜ =
{
(x, µF˜ (x)) | x ∈ U
}
(4)
Where (F˜ ) is a fuzzy set with element x and membership value
µ. Here µF˜ (x) denotes membership value of x with respect
to fuzzy set F˜ . The value of µ always lies in between 0 to 1.
U is an universe of information.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section presents details of the Fuzzy Unique Image
Transformation (FUIT) technique and methodology used to
build a secure deep model against the adversarial attacks.
A. Fuzzy Unique Image Transformation (FUIT)
FUIT creates fuzzy sets from the given range of values of
the image pixels. In an image where pixel values lie in a
range (U) from 0 to 255. We create the R fuzzy sets that use
a triangular membership function [42] (as shown in Eq.(5))
to compute the membership value (µ) of the given pixel.
The created fuzzy sets downsample the image pixels into an
interval of range in between 1 to R. The new transformed
image has pixel values between 1 to R. The FUIT technique
performs discretization of the values of the image pixel into
an interval [1, R].
Algorithm 1 Fuzzy Unique Image Transformation (FUIT)
Require: Input Image (X), R-Fuzzy Sets
1: Initialize [rows, cols] = size (X)
2: for (i=1)&(i<=rows) do
3: for (j=1)&(i<=cols) do
4: for (r=1)&(r<=R) do
5: Mv[r]=µr(Xij)
6: Here, Mv[1∗R]= An array of membership val-
ues
7: end for
8: [µmax, Index] = Max (Mv)
9: XijF = Index
10: end for
11: end for
12: Return XF (Output FUIT Transformed Image)
Algorithm 1 shows various steps of FUIT transformation of
the image X . In this paper a triangular membership function
is used to compute membership values of a pixel for the given
fuzzy set.
µ(x, p, q, r) =

0 x ≤ p
x−p
q−p p ≤ x ≤ q
r−x
r−q q ≤ x ≤ r
0 r ≤ x
(5)
Eq.(5) shows the triangular membership function with three
parameters p, q, r and input x. µ denotes triangular member-
ship value.
For an example, consider an image of size (3*3) hav-
ing values [78, 61, 120, 236, 222, 40, 10, 11, 15] as shown in
Fig.(1). The image is transformed into FUIT image using the
Algorithm 1. The new image created after the FUIT technique
Fig. 1: Various steps of Fuzzy Unique Image Transformation
has pixel values [4, 3, 6, 12, 11, 2, 1, 1, 1] based on member-
ship values [0.96, 0.72, 0.80, 0.88, 0.64, 0.67, 0.80, 0.88, 0.80]
computed from the created fuzzy sets. Fig.(2) shows various
fuzzy sets created for the FUIT transformation. After the
previous image transformed into an adversarial image the
new pixel values become [81, 63, 123, 241, 222, 40, 17, 15, 17].
After applying the FUIT algorithm the new transformed im-
age becomes [4, 3, 6, 12, 11, 2, 1, 1, 1] with membership values
[0.72, 0.56, 0.56, 0.72, 0.64, 0.67, 0.64, 0.80, 0.64].
It is clear from the Fig.(1) that the image persists its own
characteristics in both the situations (for a clean image or un-
der attack). The characteristics of the images can be expressed
in terms of the number of unique pixel values (V ). For a
clean image V = [4, 3, 6, 12, 11, 2, 1] and for an adversarial
image V = [4, 3, 6, 12, 11, 2, 1]. In both the cases ||V || = 7.
The FUIT transformation prevents the increase in the value of
||V || due to adversarial attack. In other words, a variance of
||V || remains the same for the clean image and image under
adversarial attack. The increase in the variance of ||V || due
to adversarial attack easily fools the deep model and results
in a high misclassification rate. The FUIT transformation is
deployed before forwarding the image as input to the deep
model. The model easily learns the FUIT transformed images
and shows secure nature towards the adversarial attacks. All
the training images are prepossessed with FUIT technique
while training of the deep model and all test images i.e.,
clear images or adversarial images, are also pre-processed
with FUIT technique before classification by the deep model.
Fig.(3) and Fig.(4) show the overall flow of classification and
defense mechanism used against the adversarial attacks on
deep COVID-19 model using the proposed framework.
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Fig. 2: Fuzzy Sets Created for FUIT
Fig. 3: Training of Deep Model with COVID-19 Chest X-ray Images Transformed by FUIT Technique
Fig. 4: Classification of Adversarial COVID-19 Chest X-ray Image Transformed by FUIT Technique
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section presents a description of datasets and the details
of the model and results compared with the previous proposal
for COVID-19.
A. COVID-19 Chest X-Ray Image Dataset
The performance of the proposed method is first evaluated
on COVID-19 Chest X-Ray Image Dataset [43]. The data
set includes a collection of chest X-Ray images of people
belonging to Normal, Pneumonia, and COVID-19 classes.
Several contributions from people belonging to different places
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increase the size of the dataset. At the time of this study,
the dataset contains a total of 1125 images. Among the
available 1125 images, 500 images belong to Normal Class,
500 images belong to people suffering from pneumonia, and
the remaining 125 images belong to people infected from
COVID-19. The study followed 5-fold cross-validation to
evaluate the performance of the proposed framework. Fig. (5)
shows sample images of the chest X-Ray of persons belong
to normal, pneumonia, and COVID-19 classes.
B. Model Description
Total of nine models (M1-M9) are trained using weights
initialized with three different pre-trained models i.e. Resnet-
18 [44], VGG-16 [45] and GoogLeNet [46] respectively. Table
I shows details of the nine models prepared for comparison.
The models (M1-M9) are further evaluated against the adver-
TABLE I: Description of Different Models Developed for
Chest X-Ray Dataset
Model Dataset Image Type Pre-Trained Model
M1 Chest X-Ray Clean Image Resnet-18
M2 Chest X-Ray Clean Image VGG-16
M3 Chest X-Ray Clean Image GoogLeNet
M4 Chest X-Ray FUIT Transformed Image Resnet-18
M5 Chest X-Ray FUIT Transformed Image VGG-16
M6 Chest X-Ray FUIT Transformed Image GoogLeNet
M7 Chest X-Ray Discretization Transformed Image Resnet-18
M8 Chest X-Ray Discretization Transformed Image VGG-16
M9 Chest X-Ray Discretization Transformed Image GoogLeNet
sarial images created using six different types of attacks exist
in literature. Table II shows the six different attacks that are
used in this study. Parameters of all the six attacks mentioned
in the Table II are shown in Table III.
TABLE II: Details of Different Adversarial Attacks
S.No. Attacks
1 Deep Fool [34]
2 Fast Gradient Sign Attack (FGSM) [33]
3 Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [47]
4 Carlini & Wagner (CW) [35]
5 Projected Gradient Descent With Random Start (PGD-r) [48]
6 Projected Gradient Descent Without Random Start (PGD) [48]
TABLE III: Parameters of Six Adversarial Attacks
Attack Parameters
PGD =0.3, α=4/255, Steps=40
PGD-r =0.3, α=4/255, Steps=40, Random Start=True
FGSM =0.008
CW C=2, Kappa=2, Steps=500, learning rate=0.01
Deep Fool Steps=20
BIM =8/255, α=1/255, steps=10
C. Experimental Settings
The early stop technique is used to train the models, and the
maximum epoch is set as 150. The learning rate is 0.001, and
the batch size is selected as 32. All experiments are conducted
on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS operating system with 16 GB RAM and
NVIDIA GM107M 4 GB GPU. All scripts are developed using
an open-source Pytorch 1.4 library. All images are resized to a
size required by the three pre-trained models used to initialize
the deep model weights. The deep model is trained using an
Adam optimization [36].
D. Loss Function
A loss function L is selected as cross entropy loss as shown
in Eq.(6). Here x is an input and C is class label. k is the total
number of classes.
L(x,C) = −log
(
exp (x[C])∑
k exp(x[k])
)
(6)
E. Results on Chest X-Ray Dataset
As mentioned earlier for the comparative analysis total of
nine models are developed. We evaluated the performance of
the proposed model in two settings. Models are trained for
binary and three class classification scenarios. In the case of
the binary classification, images belong to COVID-19 and
pneumonia classes are considered to come from the same
class. Initially, M1, M2, and M3 are trained and tested on the
clean chest X-Ray images. Table IV shows the performance of
the three models for binary and three class classification. For
the binary classification, the model M1 yields the highest mean
accuracy of 97.28%, and the model M3 shows the lowest mean
accuracy of 96.84%. The model M2 achieves the accuracy of
97.14%. For the three-class classification, the model M1 shows
the highest mean accuracy of 88.12%. The model M3 shows
the lowest mean accuracy of 87.03%.
TABLE IV: Classification Accuracy of Different Models ON
COVID-19 Chest X-ray Dataset
Model Accuracy (%)
M1 M2 M3
Binary Class 97.28 ±0.21 97.14 ±0.30 96.84 ±0.33
Three Class 88.12 ±0.27 87.81 ±0.36 87.03 ±0.40
TABLE V: Adversarial Attack on Models Trained Using
Clean COVID-19 Chest X-Ray Images
Attack Accuracy (Binary Class) Accuracy (Three Class)
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
PGD 54.34 51.17 50.46 47.12 46.74 44.58
PGD-r 50.12 48.31 48.12 40.17 39.51 39.23
FGSM 47.12 46.18 46.05 39.14 38.74 37.12
CW 10.74 10.25 10.05 9.81 9.19 8.89
Deep Fool 14.61 13.92 13.84 12.29 11.81 11.01
BIM 9.17 8.69 8.61 8.15 7.10 7.01
After evaluation of the performance of the models M1,M2
and M3 on the clean Chest X-Ray images, the models are
tested against the adversarial images generated from six dif-
ferent attacks, as listed in the Table II. Table V shows the
performance of the three models for binary and three class
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(a) Normal Patient-1 (b) Normal Patient-2
(c) Pneumonia Patient-1 (d) Pneumonia Patient-2
(e) COVID-19 Patient-1 (f) COVID-19 Patient-2
Fig. 5: Sample Images of Normal, COVID-19 and Pneumonia Cases From Chest X-Ray Image Dataset [43]
classification. The model M1 shows an accuracy of 54.34%
in the presence of a PGD attack. The model M1 shows the
accuracy of 50.12%, 47.12%, 10.74%, 14.61%, and 9.17% for
PGD-r, FGSM, CW, Deep Fool, and BIM attacks, respectively.
The BIM attack is the most successful attack that results in
the lowest accuracy of 9.17%. For the same attack, M2 and
M3 show an accuracy of 8.69% and 8.61%, respectively. For
three-class classification, the lowest accuracy of M1, M2, and
M3 are 8.15%, 7.10%, and 7.01%, respectively. It is clear
from the Table V that the models trained on clean images
perform poorly and highly insecure against the adversarial
images generated by the six adversarial attacks.
Again three models M4, M5 and M6 are trained for binary
and three class-classifications using the images obtained after
the FUIT transformation. Table VI shows the accuracy of
models M4, M5, and M6 when trained and test on FUIT
transformed images. The accuracy of model M4 is 96.81%
and 87.25% for binary and three class classification and little
lower than the model M1. It is clear from Table VI that the
FUIT transformed images are learnable by the deep model.
The models M4, M5, and M6 are tested against the ad-
versarial images generated using the six attacks. It is worth
TABLE VI: Classification Accuracy of Different Models ON
FUIT Transformed COVID-19 Chest X-ray Dataset
Model (FUIT) Accuracy (%)
M4 M5 M6
Binary Class 96.81 ±0.14 96.27 ±0.26 96.03 ±0.31
Three Class 87.25 ±0.17 86.95 ±0.25 86.12 ±0.29
TABLE VII: Adversarial Attack on Models Trained Using
FUIT Transformed COVID-19 Chest X-Ray Images
Attack Accuracy (Binary Class) Accuracy (Three Class)
M4 M5 M6 M4 M5 M6
PGD 96.54 96.20 95.97 87.23 86.81 85.49
PGD-r 96.47 96.13 95.59 87.12 86.79 85.41
FGSM 96.49 96.17 95.42 87.09 86.70 85.27
CW 96.12 95.89 95.14 86.73 86.67 85.26
Deep Fool 95.91 95.49 95.06 86.62 86.60 85.19
BIM 95.31 95.28 95.01 86.59 86.47 85.16
noting here all the training, test, or adversarial images are
first transformed into FUIT technique and then given as input
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to the deep model. Table VII shows the accuracy achieved by
the three models in the presence of six adversarial attacks. The
model M4 shows the highest accuracy of 96.54% and 87.23%
for the binary and three class classification when tested for
the PDG attack. The same model also shows an accuracy of
95.13% and 86.59% against the most successful attack i.e.,
BIM attack. It is clear from Table VII that the proposed FUIT
technique prevents the deep model against the adversarial
attacks and and persist high accuracy to classify the COVID-19
cases when attacked with the adversarial images.. Table VIII
and Table IX show a comparison of the developed models
with the state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods for the diagnosis of
COVDI-19 cases using the chest X-Ray images. The accuracy
of the proposed FUIT transformation-based model is compa-
rable to SOTA models and provides reliable security against
adversarial attacks. Fig.(6) and Fig.(7) show comparison of
different models to detect the COVID-19 cases in binary and
three class classification scenarios respectively.
TABLE VIII: Comparison of Accuracy of SOTA Methods
for Binary Classification
Model Mean (%)
M1 97.28
M2 97.14
M3 96.84
M4 96.81
M5 96.27
M6 96.03
Ozturk et al. [7] 98.08
Khan et al. [8] 99.01
Apostolopoulos et al. [11] 98.75
Wang et al. [9] 92.40
Hemdan et al. [49] 90
Narnin et al. [12] 97
TABLE IX: Comparison of Accuracy of SOTA Methods for
Three Class Classification
Model Mean (%)
M1 88.21
M2 87.81
M3 87.03
M4 87.25
M5 86.95
M6 86.12
Ozturk et al. [7] 87.02
Khan et al. [8] 89.50
Apostolopoulos et al. [11] 92.85
Wang et al. [9] 90.60
F. Ablation Study and Discussion
Apart from evaluating the performance of a deep model
on the FUIT processed images, the study of the performance
of the deep model trained on images transformed using the
typical discretization is also evaluated. Table X shows the
Fig. 6: Comparison of Accuracy of Different Models for
Binary Class Classification to Classify Chest X-Ray Dataset
Fig. 7: Comparison of Accuracy of Different Models for
Three Class Classification to Classify Chest X-Ray Dataset
accuracy of models M7, M8, and M9 trained for binary and
three class classification using the images transformed with
the typical discretization. In typical discretization, the range
of value of pixels in images is divided into intervals. For
TABLE X: Classification Accuracy of Different Models On
discretization-based Transformed COVID-19 Chest X-ray
Dataset
Model (discretization) Accuracy (%)
M7 M8 M9
Binary Class 96.25 ±0.23 96.01 ±0.29 95.87 ±0.32
Three Class 86.91 ±0.31 86.47 ±0.35 85.83 ±0.39
the standard discretization-based transformation, each time
pixel value is divided by L and floor value is computed to
know the interval to which the pixel value belongs. For an
example, if value of the L is 32, then the total number of
intervals is equal to 7 when pixels value has a range between
0 to 255. In this study, we set the value of L as 32. The
normal discretization is a hard assignment of intervals, and
the proposed FUIT technique is a soft assignment of intervals.
The model M7 shows the highest mean accuracy of 96.25%
and 86.91% for the binary and three class classification,
respectively. The models M7, M8, and M9 show less accuracy
than the models M4, M5, and M6. The soft assignment of
intervals using the FUIT technique is capable of dealing with
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TABLE XI: Adversarial Attack on Models Trained Using
discretization-Based Transformed COVID-19 Chest X-Ray
Images
Attack Accuracy (Binary Class) Accuracy (Three Class)
M7 M8 M9 M7 M8 M9
PGD 96.10 95.97 95.51 86.53 86.12 85.41
PGD-r 96.07 95.91 95.49 86.51 86.10 85.39
FGSM 95.86 95.80 95.31 86.12 86.09 85.21
CW 95.81 95.79 95.29 86.10 85.91 85.17
Deep Fool 95.77 95.61 95.18 85.97 85.89 85.12
BIM 95.70 95.47 94.97 85.91 85.81 84.96
uncertainty occurs during the assignment of the pixels into
the intervals, thus resulting in higher accuracy of the model
M4 compared to the model M7. Table XI shows the accuracy
of the models M7, M8, and M9 for binary and three class
classification in the presence of the six adversarial attacks.
The models trained on images transformed using the typical
discretization approach also show high accuracy to prevent
the deep COVID-19 model against the adversarial attacks but
show less accuracy as compared to models trained using the
FUIT transformed images. It is clear from the Table VII and
Table XI that the models trained using the FUIT transformed
images are more secure against the adversarial attacks while
diagnosis of the COVID-19 cases. All the nine models show
high classification accuracy for the binary class classification
and less accuracy for three class-classifications. The COVID-
19 cases share similar symptoms with the pneumonia cases,
which results in less classification accuracy in the case of the
three-class classification.
G. Results on CT Image Dataset
The proposed model is also evaluated on second available
CT Scan Image Dataset [50] for the diagnosis of COVID-19.
The dataset contains 398 images for normal patients and 399
images for the patients suffer from COVID-19. Total of nine
models (M10-M18) are trained by initialize the weighted using
the three pre-trained models Resnet-18 [44], VGG-16 [45] and
GoogLeNet [46]. Table XII shows a description of developed
models to evaluate the performance of the proposed method
on CT Image Dataset. Classification of COVID-19 cases in CT
images is a problem of binary classification. The evaluation is
performed by applying 5-fold cross-validation technique. Table
XIII shows the accuracy of nine models developed to classify
the COVID-19 cases. Fig.(8) shows sample images belong to
normal and COVID-19 cases in the CT image dataset.
The model M10 achieves the highest mean accuracy of
89.19%. The model M18 shows the lowest mean accuracy
of 87.77%. The developed models are tested to classify the
COVID-19 cases in the presence of six adversarial attacks
from the Table II. The value of L is set as 32 for models
M16, M17, and M18. Table XIV shows the accuracy of models
to classify the COVID-19 cases under the six attacks. The
models M10, M11, and M12 show degradation in classification
accuracy when tested against the adversarial CT images. The
BIM attack is again the most successful attack that drops the
TABLE XII: Description of Models Developed for CT Image
Dataset
Model Dataset Image Type Pre-Trained Model
M10 CT Image Clean Image Resnet-18
M11 CT Image Clean Image VGG-16
M12 CT Image Clean Image GoogLeNet
M13 CT Image FUIT Transformed Image Resnet-18
M14 CT Image FUIT Transformed Image VGG-16
M15 CT Image FUIT Transformed Image GoogLeNet
M16 CT Image Discretization Transformed Image Resnet-18
M17 CT Image Discretization Transformed Image VGG-16
M18 CT Image Discretization Transformed Image GoogLeNet
TABLE XIII: Performance of Different Models to Classify
Images of CT Image Datset
Model Accuracy (%)
M10 89.19 ±0.13
M11 89.12 ±0.18
M12 88.37 ±0.22
M13 88.31 ±0.17
M14 88.25 ±0.24
M15 88.07 ±0.19
M16 88.03 ±0.12
M17 87.98 ±0.11
M18 87.77 ±0.21
accuracy of model M10 from 89.19% to 8.12%. The drop in
classification accuracy for model M11 and M12 is 81.07%
and 79.86%, respectively. The highest classification accuracy
of models M10, M11, and M12 under PGD attack are 48.19%,
47.81%, and 46.65%, respectively. However, the models M13,
M14, and M15 show the accuracy of 86.12% and 86.01% and
85.97% respectively under the PGD attack.
TABLE XIV: Performance of Different Models Under Six
Different Adversarial Attacks
Attack
Accuracy (%)
Models
M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 M18
PGD 48.19 47.81 46.65 86.12 86.01 85.97 86.02 85.58 85.37
PGD-r 47.52 47.39 46.01 86.07 86.03 85.98 85.87 85.81 85.62
FGSM 43.71 43.59 41.92 86.03 86.01 85.93 85.81 85.77 85.61
CW 9.89 9.71 9.59 85.97 85.87 85.91 85.80 85.72 85.57
Deep Fool 12.19 12.01 11.86 85.92 85.83 85.78 85.71 85.70 85.56
BIM 8.12 8.05 7.91 85.21 85.19 85.01 85.02 85.01 85.01
It is clear from the Table XIV that the models M13, M14
and M15 are more secure towards the six adversarial attacks
and maintain the high accuracy to classify the COVID-19
cases. The accuracy of the models M13, M14 and M15 for
the BIM attack are 85.21%, 85.19% and 85.01% respectively.
However the accuracy of the models M16, M17 and M18 are
85.02%, 85.01% and 85.01% respectively. The accuracy of the
models M16, M17 and M18 are little less than the model M13,
M14 and M15 which shows the FUIT technique efficiently
deal with uncertainty created during the downsampling of the
image pixels into an interval. The performance of the models
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(a) CT Image of Normal Patient-1 (b) CT Image of Normal Patient-2
(c) CT Image of COVID-19 Patient-1 (d) CT Image of COVID-19 Patient-2
Fig. 8: Sample Images of Normal, COVID-19 Cases From CT Image Dataset [43]
(a) (b)
Fig. 9: Clean and Adversarial CT Image of COVID-19 Class Misclassified By Model M10 Under PGD Attack, (a) Clean
COVID-19 CT Image Classified by Model M10 with Prob(COV ID19) = 0.85 , Prob(Normal) = 0.15, (b) Adversarial
COVID-19 CT Image Misclassified with Prob(COV ID19) = 0.41 , Prob(Normal) = 0.59
M13, M14 and M15 as shown in the Table XIV verifies that
FUIT transformed images make the deep model more secure
against the adversarial attacks and helpful to develop mode
reliable deep models for the diagnosis of COVID-19 cases.
Fig.(9a) shows a clean COVID-19 CT image correctly
classified as COVID-19 case with a class probability of 0.85 by
the model M10. On the other hand when the model is attacked
with PGD attack the model classifies the same image as a
Normal case with a class probability of 0.59. Fig.(9b) shows
the adversarial image of the COVID-19 case (adversarial
image of the image shown in Fig.(9a) ). In presence of
PGD attack the class probability of COVID-19 decreases to
0.41. The difference between the clean COVID-19 CT image
and adversarial COVID-19 CT is visually unrecognizable
by humans but well recognized by the deep model. Fig.(9)
shows comparison of these two images when classified by
model M10 in presence of the PGD attack. Table XV shows
comparison of the proposed model with SOTA methods to
classify the COVID-19 cases using the CT images. Fig.(10)
shows comparison of accuracy of different models to classify
the COVID-19 cases in the CT image dataset.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel fuzzy unique image
transformation (FUIT) technique as a pre-processing step that
prevents the COVID-19 deep model against the adversarial at-
tacks. The FUIT technique downsamples the image pixels into
an interval by using the created fuzzy sets. The FUIT technique
prevents an increase in the variance of the number of unique
pixels of the given image. This results in an equal number
of unique pixels values in the clean and adversarial images.
The deep model trained using the FUIT transformed images
shows robust and secure performance against the adversarial
attacks. The experiment and results on two available COVID-
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TABLE XV: Comparison of Proposed Model With SOTA
Methods to Classify CT Images
Model Accuracy(%)
M10 89.19
M11 89.12
M12 88.37
M13 88.31
M14 88.25
M15 88.07
M16 88.03
M17 87.98
M18 87.77
Bernheim et al. [6] 88
Angelov et al. [51] 88.60
Fig. 10: Comparison of Accuracy of Different Models for
Binary Class Classification to Classify CT Image Dataset
19 diagnosis datasets validate that the model maintains high
accuracy to classify the COVID-19 cases in various non-
targeted adversarial attacks. Moreover, the proposed model
trains more secure deep models that prevent the COVID-19
deep model from the adversarial attacks.
The study is performed using datasets with significantly
fewer images, which could be one drawback of this study. In
future, the models will be trained on more images collected
from other publicly available repositories and nearby local
hospitals. Besides, an inspection of the FUIT to develop the
deep models to classify the images received from various
research domains can be considered a natural extension of
this study.
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